If a nation's economic performance improves, how much extra happiness does that buy its citizens? Most public debate assumes --without real evidence --that the answer is a lot. This paper examines the question by using information on well-being in Western countries. The data are of four kinds: on reported happiness, on reported life satisfaction, on reported job satisfaction, and on the number of suicides. These reveal patterns that are not visible to the anecdotal eye.
In industrialized countries, well-being appears to rise as real national income grows. But the rise is so small as to be sometimes almost undetectable. Unemployment, however, seems to be a large source of unhappiness. This suggests that governments ought to be trying to reduce the amount of joblessness in the economy. In a country that is already rich, policy aimed instead at raising economic growth may be of comparatively little value.
Introduction
Economic performance is not intrinsically interesting.
No-one is concerned in a genuine sense about the level of gross national product last year or about next year's exchange rate. People have no innate interest in the money supply, inflation, growth, inequality, unemployment, and the rest. The stolid greyness of the business pages of our newspapers seems to mirror the fact that economic numbers matter only indirectly.
The relevance of economic performance is that it may be a means to an end. That end is not the consumption of beefburgers, nor the accumulation of television sets, nor the vanquishing of some high level of interest rates, but rather the enrichment of mankind's feeling of well-being. Economic things matter only in so far as they make people happier.
This paper is concerned with the economics of happiness. Unlike gross domestic product and inflation, happiness is not something that governments try to record from year to year. This essay will show that they could and, for the issues of Economic Trends in the next century, possibly should 1 .
Most politicians who pronounce about the economic matters of the day do so under a set of assumptions about human enjoyment that are usually not articulated to the listener. The chief of these, perhaps, is the belief that by raising its output and productivity a society truly betters itself. Real income has been If not, why not, and what should governments now be trying to do?
Deciding how much authentic well-being is bought by economic progress is a difficult task. It seems logically necessary, however, if economic and social policy is to be designed in a rational way. If taxpayers' pound notes can be thought of as seed-corn, they could be scattered upon ground devoted to raising innovation and economic growth, or, for example, upon that aimed at combating social problems, or upon something different. Society has to pick those places to throw the seed-corn especially thickly. It is not easy to know how such choices can be made in a systematic way. However, a social scientist might help those 1 Should economists study happiness, one might ask? There are some natural answers. First, presumably this subject really matters. Second, psychologists have for many years worked with data on self-reported happiness. They ought to know more about human psychology than we do. Third, there are grounds --laid out later --to believe that subjective well-being can be studied in a systematic way. Well-being regression equations have the same structure all over the world. Fourth, subjective wellbeing measures are correlated with observable phenomena. For example, people who report high happiness scores tend to laugh and smile more, and to be rated by others as happier (Pavot et al, 1991; Diener, 1984; Watson and Clark, 1991) . Fifth, we might be able to use happiness data to test old ideas in new ways. For example, if one wished to know whether inflation is bad, one might ask whether, in inflationary periods, people en masse unknowingly tick lower down their happiness score sheets (Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald, 1996) . . who mould policy if he or she could point to unnoticed patterns in data on happiness and satisfaction. This paper takes a small step along that path. Richard Easterlin (1974 Easterlin ( , 1995 was one of the first economists to study statistics over time on the reported level of happiness. His data came from the United States. Easterlin's 1974 paper's main objectives were, first, to suggest that individual happiness appears to be the same across poor countries and rich countries, and, second, to argue that economic growth does not raise well-being.
Easterlin suggested that we should think of people as getting utility from a comparison of themselves with others close to them: happiness is relative. The modern stress on the benefits of higher total national income is then misplaced, 2 Recent work includes Argyle (1989) , Douthitt et al (1992) , Fox and Kahneman (1992) , Larsen et al (1984) and Mullis (1992) . Comparatively little research seems to have addressed the issue of how well-being changes through the years.
3 Andrew Clark's recent work (for example, 1992, 1996a,b) is an exception.
because individuals all move up together. A similar theme is taken up in Hirsch (1976) and Scitvosky (1976) , and still more recently in Frank (1985) Source: Table 8 of Easterlin (1974) The first thing that is noticeable is that "pretty happy" is the typical answer, and that "not too happy", which is the lowest score people can assign themselves, is
given by slightly more than a tenth of the population.
First indications from Table 1 are not encouraging to the idea that growth leads to more well-being. There is little sign of a time trend in the answer "very happy". The proportion of American respondents saying this was around one third both early in the 1970s and late in the 1980s. Over the period, however, a declining number of people seem to say that they are not too happy, and more state that they are pretty happy.
The raw data are consistent with the view that the category "pretty happy"
is expanding while "not too happy" is shrinking. Nevertheless, the effect is not 5 The new paper by Easterlin (1995) presents modern US data showing that the % of people "very happy" did not rise between 1972 and 1991. This appears a touch misleading, because the % unhappy fell quite markedly.
dramatic, and these are only raw data that may be being moulded predominantly by a population that is changing its composition. Blanchflower, Oswald and Warr (1993) explore the matter more systematically. They examine whether there is an upward trend in well-being after controlling for demographic and other compositional changes in the American economy. Their conclusion is that there is a positive time trend, but that it is very slight. Intriguingly, there seems to be evidence of a cycle in happiness (especially for men). Blanchflower,
Oswald and Warr show that the rise in happiness has not been spread evenly. It seems that American men have got happier while American women have experienced little growth in subjective well-being. Blanchflower and Oswald (1996) find some evidence that the young are growing relatively happier.
These results are not consistent with the conclusion of Easterlin (1974) that, perhaps because of ever-increasing aspirations and concern for relativities, the human lot does not improve over time. They are more like the arguments of Andrews (1991) and Veenhoven (1991 Inglehart (1990) , who uses them to study changing cultural values. Table 2 reports some of the data on life satisfaction for these countries.
The first thing that is obvious is the large differences across nations. In
Denmark, for example, more than half the population say they are "very satisfied", while in Italy the figure is around one in ten. These divergent numbers are likely to reflect cultural and linguistic differences. This is partly the difficulty of translation (words like happiness, contentment and satisfaction have subtle distinctions in English, and in other languages). But it is not all variation in language. As Inglehart (1990) points out, Switzerland makes an ideal laboratory to test this. German-speaking Swiss, French-speaking Swiss, and
Italian-speaking Swiss all express higher satisfaction levels than do native Germans, French and Italians.
The second thing that is noticeable is that well-being is not moving uniformly upwards. Table 2 calculates from country to country the mean level, for each of the two halves of the period, of those answering "very satisfied".
This smooths out some of the (fairly large) fluctuations in people's year-to-year answers. Thus in the period 1973-1981 in Belgium, for example, on average 39.7% of the people interviewed said that they were very satisfied with their lives. Over the ensuing decade, this figure dropped dramatically. For 1982 For -1990 , the proportion of respondents saying very satisfied was 24.7%. This evidence shows no gain over time of the sort to be expected if real income growth raises well-being. However, as the rest of People's answers to these questions are coded on a four-point scale running from "disagree strongly" to "agree strongly". Starred items are coded in reverse, so that, for example, zero then corresponds to "agree strongly". These twelve are then combined into a total GHQ level of mental distress in which high numbers correspond to low feelings of well-being. The data provide a mental stress or, much less accurately, unhappiness level for each individual in the sample.
There are various ways to work with GHQ responses. One is to calculate so-called Caseness scores. These are produced by taking people's answers to the twelve questions that are listed above and summing the number of times the person places himself or herself in either the fairly stressed or highly stressed category. With this method, the lowest possible level of well-being corresponds to a caseness level of 12 (meaning that the individual felt stressed on every one of the twelve questions). The highest level of well-being corresponds to 0 (meaning that the individual felt stressed on none of the twelve questions). Individuals with high caseness levels are viewed by psychologists as people who would benefit from psychiatric treatment.
The British Household Panel Survey data show that income has no strong role to play, but that joblessness does. Clark and Oswald (1994) fail to find any statistically significant effect from income. The sharp impact of unemployment, however, is illustrated by Tables 3 and 4 . These use data on six thousand British workers in 1991. Mental distress is twice as high among the unemployed as among those who have work.
Interestingly, research suggests that the worst thing about losing one's job is not the drop in take-home income. It is the non-pecuniary distress. To put this differently, most regression results imply that an enormous amount of extra income would be required to compensate people for having no work.
Eurobarometer data, in Table 5 and Figure 1 , also show that the unemployed feel much less satisfied with life 6 , and indicate that the relative distress from unemployment does not appear to be trending downwards through the years (the 'unhappiness gap' is not secularly shrinking The medical term for attempted suicide is para-suicide. Data in Smith (1985) record the probably little-appreciated fact that in Britain a fifth of all emergency admissions to hospital are due to para-suicide. Dooley et al (1989) report that para-suicide is between 8 and 20 times more common than successful suicide. Five million Americans, they estimate, have attempted suicide at some time in their lives. The data that Platt and Kreitman (1985) gather on Edinburgh males suggest that, among unemployed men in the lowest social class (Class V), one in twenty try to kill themselves in a given year. This attitude may not be the right one. As writer Wilfred Sheen remarked:
suicide is about life, being in fact the sincerest criticism that life gets. If the aim is to understand human well-being and the value of life, suicide data offer rich --though upsetting --information that would be impossible to glean in any other way. The reason is that suicides represent choices in response to (un)happiness that are intrinsically more compelling than replies made to happiness survey questions, and data that, by their nature, cannot be generated in a laboratory experiment. It might, of course, be argued by a social scientist that suicide decisions are not rational. Perhaps they are simply a sign of mental illness, and therefore do not contain reliable information. Medical opinion has debated this view and not accepted it in a wholehearted way. There is evidence that suicides occur more frequently both among those who in an objective sense have the least to live for, and after unpleasant events in a person's life. The latter include unpleasant economic events. Humphry (1992) and Richman (1992) discuss the notion of, and evidence for, rational suicide.
For the post-war period, suicide is dropping through time. By such a benchmark, life looks like it is improving. There is little reason to impute causality, but the data do not contradict the natural idea that greater real income might make fewer people so miserable that they want to kill themselves. Data for the whole century, in so far as they are reliable, suggest the same. In 1911, 2600 men committed suicide in England and Wales. In 1990, 2800 did so. The population over that period nearly doubled. In this sense, extreme unhappiness might be said to be dropping. Historical statistics also reveal that total suicide deaths reached their maximum in the Great Depression, which is consistent with the idea that economics may have some role to play in this area.
Figure 2 provides data on a dozen rich countries. Although it would probably be unwise to read too much into the plot, high real income is positively, not negatively, correlated with the suicide rate.
To explore the idea that money buys happiness, it might be natural to look at data on suicide and low income. This can be done in an indirect way. Charlton et al (1992) show that the suicide death rate is largely independent of social class. Thus, roughly speaking, economically prosperous people do not take their own lives less than the poor. There is one type of exception to this: those men unemployed and seeking work at census were at 2-3 fold greater risk of suicide death than the average, Charlton et al (1992) . The study by Platt and Kreitman (1985) produces The wordings thus differ slightly between countries, but seem sufficiently similar to allow rough comparison. In both countries the samples for the paper's analysis are restricted to current employees. Although an interesting special case, the self-employed are omitted. There is a small literature suggesting that they have intrinsically greater job satisfaction than employees. Tables 7 and 8 give the raw numbers on job satisfaction for each country. British data are given in Table 8 . The proportion stating "very satisfied"
with their job is on average 43% over the period, which is similar to the numbers for the USA. In 1973, the proportion of British adults calling themselves very satisfied at work was 42.7%. In 1983, at the end of the period for which GHS data are available, the number was 39.0%. There is thus if anything some sign of a slight fall in the level of job satisfaction in Britain.
This finding of fairly flat job satisfaction levels through time mirrors
Weaver (1980) on earlier US data. One interpretation, supported by the evidence in , is that satisfaction is somehow inherently relativistic, and based on comparisons with others.
Finding 7 In Britain and America the level of job satisfaction is not rising over
time.
V. Conclusions
Every day, in every industrialized country of the world, journalists and politicians give out a conscious and unconscious message. It is that better economic performance means more happiness for a nation. This idea is rarely questioned. We feel we would be more cheery if our boss raised our pay, and assume that countries must be roughly the same.
The results in this paper suggest that, in a developed nation, economic progress buys only a small amount of extra happiness. Four main pieces of evidence have been offered for this claim.
1. Reported happiness in the US has gone up only fractionally over the post-war period.
2. Reported levels of "satisfaction with life" in Europe are only slightly higher than they were twenty years ago. Some countries show drops.
3. Although the rate of suicide in Britain has fallen by approximately one third over the last hundred years, the number for men has risen, in almost all Western nations, from the 1970s to the present. Rich countries seem to have high suicide rates.
4. Job satisfaction has not increased, over those parts of the last quarter of a century for which data are available, in the US and the UK.
These gains in national well-being appear to be so slight that a case could be made, as by Richard Easterlin (1974) , that economic growth is worthless.
This paper argues that Easterlin is wrong --but only just.
Because the task of measuring well-being is a difficult and relatively unconventional one, the paper's results cannot be accepted uncritically. First, it might be argued that interview responses to happiness and satisfaction questions do not mean anything reliable. Second, it might be argued that the use of suicide data as an indicator of a society's happiness is too strange to be taken seriously, or that such data are unhelpful because they are a reflection of mental illness and not of any objectively low quality of life. There is no wholly convincing way to dispose of such objections. As in any area of social science, it is prudent to view the paper's punchlines cautiously. Nevertheless, a simple reply to critics is that these kinds of statistics are probably the only ones available to us if we wish to measure well-being, and that, at the very least, they raise doubts about routine beliefs. Moreover, counter-arguments to the methodological criticisms have been produced many times. It is known in the psychological and medical literatures that objective economic events are correlated with happiness scores and with suicide (and para-suicide). Unemployment appears to be the primary economic source of unhappiness. If so, economic growth should not be a government's primary concern.
Background Notes
The main sources of information used in the paper are the Eurobarometer Surveys of 1973 onwards, the British General Household Surveys of 1973 onwards, the first 1991 sweep of the British Household Panel Study, and the US General Social Surveys of 1972 onwards. These are face-to-face surveys of randomly sampled individuals. Suicide data come from the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys. All the paper's sources of data are publicly available. This paper has not attempted to document its literature sources in the way a normal academic paper would. The paper's general conclusions in some cases agree or overlap with those in Andrews (1991) , Smith (1979) , Shin (1980) , Thomas and Hughes (1986) , Veenhoven (1991 Veenhoven ( , 1993 and Weaver (1980) . Although little-read by economists, the pioneering work on the statistical study of well-being includes Andrews and Withey (1976) , Andrews and Inglehart (1978) , Campbell, Converse and Rodgers (1976 ), Campbell (1981 ), Cantril (1965 , Diener (1984) , and Larsen, Diener and Emmons (1984) . A good introduction is Argyle (1989) . Economists interested in dipping into a huge recent literature might also look at Andrews (1991) , Warr (1987 and 1990 a,b) and Ng (1996) . Blanchflower and Oswald (1996) conclude that the young are getting systematically happier. Birdi et al (1995) , and Warr (1992) argue that job satisfaction is U-shaped in age, and give other results. Blanchflower and Oswald (1997) find the self-employed are happier.
Hirsch (1976) is a well-known critique of the value of increased real national income. Scitovsky (1976) makes similar arguments. My attention has been drawn to an early happiness study in this journal, Morawetz et al (1977) . Many of the British results on the distress caused by unemployment are due to Jahoda (1982 ), Peter Warr (1978 and Jackson et al (1983) . New work includes Whelan (1992) and Gallie and Russell (1995) . The unemployment findings are now conventional in the psychology literature but probably still not well-known among economists. Innovative early work by economists includes Bjorklund (1985) and Edin (1988) , who fail to find marked effects for Sweden. More recent research has uncovered large negative effects of joblessness upon wellbeing. The findings of Gerlach and Stephan (1996) , Korpi (1997) and Winkelmann and Winkelmann (1997) seem particularly important. They control for personspecific fixed effects. The coefficient on unemployment in a panel well-being equation turns out to be fairly similar to that in a pure cross-section equation.
There are potential links between the happiness literature and the literatures on the quality of life and the Human Development Index, but they have yet to be forged. Nussbaum and Sen (1993) contains a set of essays on the border between philosophy and economics. Smith (1993) is a critical inquiry into HDI. Crafts (1997) is a recent application of HDI methods.
If well-being depends upon relative income, most of economists' optimal tax theory is incomplete or worse. The standard literature assumes that in setting taxes a government should pay no attention to people's feelings of how they compare with others: little or no role is assigned to personal notions of justice or relative deprivation. Some of the few attempts to change this are Boskin and Sheshinski (1978) , Layard (1980) and Oswald (1983) .
International comparisons using the multi-national International Social Survey Programme are given in Birdi et al (1995) , Blanchflower and Freeman (1997) and Curtice (1993) . This paper focuses on well-being in developed countries. It seems likely that real income growth does buy a lot of happiness in a developing nation. Veenhoven (1991) presents evidence consistent with that. 
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The vertical axis measures the proportion of people saying they were "fairly satisfied with life" as a whole. The data source is the Eurobarometer Surveys, which provides a random sample here of approximately 120,000 European men.
Running a trend line through each series produces almost exactly the same gradient, namely, just over 0.2. Source: Blanchflower, Oswald and Warr (1993) from US General Social Surveys. That paper gives data for each year.
Weighted to control for oversampling of blacks in certain years. Source for both Tables: Clark and Oswald (1994) using BHPS data on GHQ scores Source: Blanchflower, Oswald and Warr (1993) from US General Social Surveys. That paper gives data for each year.
Weighted to control for oversampling of blacks in certain years. Source: Blanchflower, Oswald and Warr (1993) from the General Household Surveys.
